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A MOSQUITO IN THE OINTMENT: 
ADVERSE HIPAA IMPLICATIONS FOR 
HEALTH-RELATED REMOTE 
SENSING RESEARCH AND 
A "REASONABLE" SOLUTION 
Paul M. Secunda' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: a researcher investigating 
the spread of West Nile Virus' in the United States seeks to de-
termine whether increased precipitation levels in different geo-
graphical regions across the country correlate with (through a 
larger population of mosquitoes)' a higher frequency of West 
Nile Virus in humans.' Mter gathering the relevant precipita-
tion georeferenced data through remote sensing techniques,' the 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. I would like 
to thank Joanne Gabrynowicz and Jacqueline Serrao of the National Remote Sensing 
and Space Law Center for humoring a novice and introducing me to the exciting field of 
remote sensing and space law. I dedicate this piece to my children, Jacob Ari and Isa-
bella Julia, and to the betterment oftheir world. 
1 West Nile Virus is a vector-borne, viral infection that can cause inflammation of 
the brain. In certain cases, it can be fatal. For a general description of the characteris-
tics of West Nile Virus, see generally WebMD Website, Health Guide A-Z: West Nile 
Virus, at http://my.webrnd.com/hw/health_guide_atoz-Clast visited May 6, 2004) [herein-
after Health Guide A-Z]; see also Center for Disease Control and Prevention Website, 
West Nile Virus, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidodldvbidlwestnile!index.htm (last visited May 
8.2004). 
2 West Nile Virus is spread by mosquitoes throughout North America. The first 
major outbreak was in New York in 1999. Mosquitoes obtain the virus by biting infected 
birds. See Health Guide A-Z, supra note 1. 
3 This hypothetical is based, at least in part, on the work of four NASA students at 
the Ames Research Center who produced a risk map showing the potential risk of West 
Nile Virus being carried by mosquitoes in Monterey County, California. See SGE News, 
SGE: Ecosystem Science and Technology Branch of the Earth Science Division of 
NASA's Ames Research Center web site, at http://geo.arc.nasa.gov/sge!news.html (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2004) (news release regarding this study was first released on September 
2,2003). 
• ''Remote sensing refers to satellite or aircraft technology used to observe the earth 
from distant vantage, points. Cameras mounted on these platforms capture detailed 
pictures of the earth that can be employed for a range of business applications, such as 
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researcher still requires health information from numerous lo-
cal hospitals and other health care providers and agencies to 
attempt to link the precipitation data with the number of West 
Nile Virus cases in a given location. Unbeknownst to our well-
meaning researcher, he is about to face numerous procedural 
hurdles as he seeks access to this necessary health information 
for his research protocol. 
Although the connection between this researcher's informa-
tion-gathering conundrum and space law may not at first glance 
appear evident, this type of dilemma has important ramifica-
tions for space law in general, as remote sensing law has be-
come an increasingly significant and emerging area within the 
field of space law.' Indeed, over recent years, remote sensing 
has been utilized for a growing number of applications, includ-
ing in the areas of public and human health research.6 It is this 
identifying very early stages of diseased or drought-stressed crops in farmlands; manag-
ing forests, wetlands and fisheries; and measuring climatic or oceanic conditions," Na-
tional Remote Sensing and Space Law web site, About the Center, at 
http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu(lastvisitedOct.11. 2004). The data acquired from 
remote sensing research techniques is sometimes referred to as "geospatial" or "geo-
referenced" data. [d. Geospatial data should become more available as NASA hopes to 
launch more than eighty missions between 1995 and 2010, carrying over 200 different 
instruments, providing measurements of many environmental change parameters, some 
for the first time. See SENSOR EVALUATION PROJECT: INTRODUCTION, CENTER FOR 
HEALTH APPLICATIONS OF AEROSPACE RELATED TECHNOLOGIES (CHAART), at 
http://www .geo.arc.nasa.gov/sgelhealthlsensorlsensor.html (last updated Aug. 2002); see 
also Louisa R. Beck et aL, PERSPECTNE, Remote Sensing and Human Health: New Sen-
sors and New Opportunities, 6 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217, 217 (2000) ("These 
new capabilities will improve spectral, spatial, and temporal resolution, allowing explo-
ration of risk factors previously beyond the capabilities of remote sensing."). Specifi-
cally, factors which will be able to be remotely sensed are: vegetation or crop type, defor-
estation, flooded forests, general flooding, permanent water, wetlands, and soil mois-
ture. See id. at 222. 
5 Generally, all nations have nonexclusive right to use space. See Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Vse of Outer Space, In-
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. I, 18 V.S.T. 2410, 610 
V.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force on Oct. 10, 1967) {hereinafter Outer Space TreatyJ. 
Remote sensing, in turn, has long been recognized as a permitted "use" of outer space. 
See CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF OUTER SPACE 730-32 
(1982). 
6 The growing relevance of remote sensing to health research applications has been 
consistently demonstrated over the last number of years by the increased number of 
institutional resources available for conducting health-related remote sensing research, 
as well as the increased number of articles and workshops dealing with these issues. 
See, e.g., Beck et aI., supra note 4, at 217 (describing the increased number ofinvestiga-
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connection between remote sensing and health research that 
this article seeks to explore in light of the newly enacted Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy 
Rule,' the first comprehensive federal statute dealing with 
health information privacy concerns. 
Prior to April 14, 2003, this remote sensing researcher in 
the hypothetical above would most likely have been able to con-
tact these health care providers and work out an arrangement 
to obtain the necessary health information,' all the while pledg-
ing to maintain, to the greatest extent possible, the confidential-
ity of the health records of the affected individuals.' Today, 
tors in the health community using remote sensing techniques to explore disease-vector 
habitats and human transmission risks, and describing two such studies involving Lyme 
disease and cholera); Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Paper Presentation, Data, Information, 
Confidentiality, and the Legal Landscape, NASA Confidentiality & Geospatial Data 
Workshop (Washington D.C. July 16, 2003) (examining the application of remote sens-
ing law to human health research issues at a workshop sponsored by NASA's Public 
Health Application Program in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences) 
(materials on file with author); see also Beck et al., supra note 4, at 220-21 ("NASA has 
participated in sessions on remote sensing and health at professional meetings spon-
sored by national and international health organizations."). Indeed, NASA's Ames Re-
search Center in California has been involved in public health work since 1985. 
CHAART was established by NASA in 1995 to continue this work in the area of remote 
sensing and health and it continues to develop technologies for disease risk modeling 
(also called "landscape epidemiology"), with a special emphasis on vector-borne diseases. 
See SGE Research web site, at http://www.arc.nasa.gov/sge/research.html (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2004). CHAART seeks to make its remote sensing expertise available to re-
searchers throughout the health community. Id. 
7 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, PUB. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d·2 note (Aug. 21, 1996) [hereinafter IllPAA]. HIPAA was 
enacted as an amendment to the Employee Retirement Insurance and Security Act of 
1973 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999). The applicable HIPAA provisions can be 
found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181·1183. 
8 But see infra Part TILB (discussing the need for an institutional review board's 
approval for certain federally conducted or supported human subjects research, even 
prior to the enactment of the HIPAA Privacy Rule). 
9 The remote sensing researcher would also likely have previously been constrained 
from disclosing sensitive health information under state statutory medical privacy laws 
and principles of state tort law (including the torts of invasion of privacy and breach of 
confidentiality). See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Protecting Per-
sonal Health Information in Research: Understanding the HIPAA Privacy Rule 1 (Apr. 
14, 2003), available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_02.asp (last modified 
Sept. 25, 2003) {hereinafter Understanding HIPAA]. Some of these state laws may still 
apply after HIP AA to the extent that state law is more stringent than HIP AA. In such 
cases, HIPAA would not preempt such state laws. See In re: PPA Litigation, 2003 WL 
22203734, at *12 (N.J. Super. L., Sept. 23, 2003) (discussing HIPAA preemption provi-
sions at 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a) (2003». 
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however, the enactment of HIP AA, and the subsequent promul-
gation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule," have altered the applicable 
legal rules for any remote sensing researcher contemplating the 
use of health information as part of his or her research.ll In-
deed, it is the central thesis of this article that the new HIPAA 
Privacy Rule is a fly (or, better put, a mosquito) in the ointment; 
a more inconvenient than necessary procedural scheme that 
could potentially, and inadvertently, derail new advances in 
medical research made possible for the fIrst time by innovative 
remote sensing technologies. 
Interestingly enough, this change in legal orientation for 
remote sensing researchers engaged in health-related research 
does not derive from the fact that a remote sensing researcher is 
a "covered entity',12 under the HIPAA Privacy Rule; in almost all 
cases, they are not.13 Nevertheless, hospitals, doctors, and other 
health care providers from whom health information must be 
obtained are normally considered covered entities." AE a result, 
under HIPAA authorization standards," the health care pro-
vider must normally obtain a signed HIPAA-compliant authori-
zation form16 from each individual from whom the researcher 
seeks protected health information (PH!)." Since there may be 
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of individuals being 
studied for a particular research study, it might be very difficult 
to obtain an authorization from every individual; and/or at the 
very least, it would be prohibitively expensive. 
Nonetheless, recognizing that researchers still need access 
to health information to conduct medical research, the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule contains an express exception from the authoriza-
10 HIP AA, supra note 7. 
11 See PPA Litigation, 2003 WL at *8 (noting that enactment ofHIPAA Privacy Rule 
marks dramatic departure from the current state of medical and legal practice). 
12 For a definition of this term, see infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
13 See DEPART:MENT OF HEALTlI AND HUMAN SERVICES, Privacy Boards and the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule 1 (Sept. 25, 2003), available at http://privacyruleandresearch. 
nih.gov/privacy _boards_hipaa_privacy_rule.asp (last modified Aug. 4, 2004) ("Research-
ers are not themselves covered entities, unless they also provide health care and engage 
in any of the covered electronic transactions.") [hereinafter Privacy Board Fact Sheet]. 
14 See infra notes 29~32 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra Part II.B. 
16 See id. 
17 See infra note 33. 
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tion. requirement for researchers." Under the research excep-
tion, the researcher normally must obtain a waiver of, or altera-
tion to, the authorization requirement through either the use of 
an institutional review board (IRB) or HIPAA privacy board 
(HPB).19 Unfortunately, the waiver standards promulgated for 
)ltilization by these review boards are vague and ambiguous and 
could potentially cause disparate and inequitable results in 
whether, and how, such health information is disclosed to re-
searchers.20 For this reason, this article proposes that the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule's research waiver standards be modified to 
substitute more readily understandable, and precedentially-
based, legal terminology. This proposed legal salve substitutes 
the. application of a Fourth Amendment-like "reasonable-
ness/special needs" approach for the current "necessary and 
adequate" approach for future research waiver cases." 
As discussed in more detail below, the benefits of substitut-
ing this new standard are many. As currently written, the re-
search waiver standards under the HIPAA Privacy Rule may 
lelid to many unanticipated, and undesirable, results, including: 
(1) a dramatic increase in the cost associated with the collection 
of health data; (2) an increase in time expended before such 
data can be obtained; and, in the end, (3) a reduction in the use 
of sophisticated remote sensing techniques altogether in medi-
cal research. In short, compliance with the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule's research exemption might generate difficulties with a 
West Nile Virus-type research study as a consequence of remote 
sensing researchers not being able to know for certain whether 
they will ever receive the necessary health-related information 
18 See infra Part III. ''The Rule balances an individuals' interest in keeping his or 
her health information confidential with other social benefits, including health care 
research." See Understanding HIPAA, supra note 9, at i. 
19 See infra Parts III.B and HI.e. 
:w See infra Part N.A; see also Pietrina Scaraglino, Complying with HIPAA: A Guide 
for the University and its Counsel, 29 J.e. & D.L. 525, 565 (2003) ("The requirements of 
the Privacy Regulations concerning access to PHI pursuant to an IRB or Privacy Board 
waiver are more complex and have created some anxiety in the research community."), 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion applies only to government and state actors and most remote sensing researchers 
do not fall into this category. Id. For reasons discussed below the reasonableness stan-
dard is borrowed from the public sector for purposes of this analysis. See infra Part 
IV.B. 
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to complete their studies. On the other hand, the proposal ad-
vanced in this article has the advantage of being part of a well-
developed area of law to which researchers and covered entities 
alike may turn for guidance when deciding whether to grant a 
waiver to the HIPAA authorization requirement and release 
PHI to remote sensing researchers for research purposes. 
In Part II of this Article, I offer a brief introduction to the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule, including its legislative and regulatory 
history, as well as pertinent substantive provisions surrounding 
the authorization requirement. In Part III, I focus on the re-
search exception to the normal PHI authorization requirement, 
with special emphasis on the nature and characteristics of IRBs 
and HPBs. Finally, with the applicable HIPPA provisions con-
cerning health-related remote sensing research front and cen-
ter, Part N concludes by proposing an important modification to 
the existing research waiver standards through application of a 
"reasonableness/special needs" balancing analysis, first devel-
oped in the Fourth Amendment privacy context. 
II. AHIPAAPRIMER 
A. Legislative and Regulatory History 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA)" was enacted by Congress to address concerns 
relating to non-discrimination in the provision of health insur-
ance, the portability of health insurance coverage, pre-existing 
conditions exclusions, electronic data interchanges, and con-
cerns surrounding the confidentiality of health information.23 
Specifically with regard to privacy concerns, Congress included 
a section entitled, "Recommendations With Respect to Privacy of 
Certain Health Information,,,24 which mandated the Secretary of 
22 HIP AA, supra note 7. 
~ See generally ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS LAw 46-47 (2nd ed. 2000). 
24 This mandate was a response to growing concerns over the potential abuse of 
confidential health information by health care entities and others without an individ-
ual's consent or authorization. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
Institutional Review Boards and the HIPAA Privacy Rule - NIH Fact Sheet 1 (Aug. 15, 
2004] HIPAA AND REMOTE SENSING RESEARCH 257 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to provide to Congress "de-
tailed recommendations on standards with respect to the pri-
vacy of individually identifiable health information."25 Congress 
directed HHS to issue such a recommendation by August 21, 
1997.26 
Eventually, HHS' final health privacy regulations (the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule)27 went into effect for most "covered enti-
ties" on April 14, 2003.28 As defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
"covered entities" include health care providers," health care 
clearinghouses,30 and other health plan entities" that transmit 
any health information in electronic form in connection with a 
transaction covered by HIPAA.32 These covered entities are 
2003), available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/irbandprivacyrule.asp (last 
modified Aug. 4, 2004) [hereinafter IRB Fact Sheet]. 
25 HIPAA, supra note 7, at § 264(a). HHS was directed to consider: "(1) The rights 
that an individual who is a subject of individually identifiable health information should 
have[;] (2) The procedures that should be established for the exercise of such rights[; 
and] (3) The uses and disclosures of such information that should be authorized or re-
quired." ld. § 264(b). 
26 See id. §264(c). 
27 See General Administrative Requirements, General Provisions, 45 C.F.R. §§ 
160.101 - 160.104 (2003); Security and Privacy, Privacy of Individually Identifiable 
Health Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501 . 164.534 (2003). 
2B After HHS submitted a report to Congress urging the enactment of extensive 
privacy legislation, and Congress failed to act by August 21, 1999, HHS was required by 
HIPAA to finalize its regulations on privacy. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAw, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw· 2002 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 218·219 
(Stanleyed. 2002). After submitting proposed regulations in November 1999 and receiv-
ing many comments from numerous parties, the final HIP AA Privacy Rule was issued in 
December 2000. [d. at 219. After further postponement by the new presidential ad· 
ministration, final modifications to the Privacy Rule were adopted on August 14, 2002, 
with a new compliance date for most plans of April 14, 2003. [d. In reality, all covered 
entities are now required to be in compliance with the Privacy Rule, as even smaller 
covered entities had only until April 14, 2004 to comply. See HIPAA, supra note 7, at 
§264(c)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d·4(b). 
29 Health care providers include doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies. 45 C.F.R. § 
160.103. 
30 Health care clearinghouse "means a public or private entity, including a billing 
service, repricing company, community health management information system or 
community health information system, and 'value-added' networks and switches," that 
either processes health information in one of two designated manners. [d. 
31 Other health plan entities include health insurance issuers, health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), issuers of long-term care policies, other employee welfare benefit 
policies that provide health benefits, and other government-related programs. [d. 
32 Interestingly, this definition suggests that as long as a health care provider or 
other covered entity does not ''transmit health information in electronic form," the 
health care provider is not covered under HIPAA. [d. Unfortunately for most covered 
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regulated by the terms of the HIPAA Privacy Rule in how they 
both use and disclose PHI.33 
As a result, unless a remote sensing researcher is employed 
by a covered entity, it is unlikely that the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
would apply directly to the activities ofthe researcher." Never-
theless, because remote sensing researchers, like other re-
searchers, utilize medical research, and by extension PHI, as 
part of their research activities,35 it is likely that many remote 
sensing researchers will have to adhere to several HIPAA stan-
dards in order to obtain PHI from covered entities with whom 
they interact.36 
B. Pertinent Substantive Provisions37 
Because researchers are not directly covered entities as dis-
cussed above, the issue regarding use of PHI for remote sensing 
research purposes boils down to essentially one issue: Under 
what circumstances maya covered entity disclose PHI to a re-
searcher wishing to combine geospatial data with medical re-
search data? 
entities, tills exception does not provide much solace as almost all potentially covered 
entities, with the possible exception of some doctors or pharmacies, engage in -some 
manner of electronic transmission of health information. 
33 PHI is defined in the HIP AA Privacy Rule as individually identifiable health 
information that is transmitted or maintained in any form of media. Notable exceptions 
to this broad rule are provided for employment records and education records. Id. The 
HIP AA Privacy Rule is enforced by HHS' Office of Civil Rights. See Understanding 
HIPAA, supra note 9, at i. 
M See supra note 13. 
35 This scenario is demonstrated by the West Nile Virus example in the introductory 
section of this article. See supra Part 1. 
36 See Understanding HIPAA, supra note 9, at l. 
31 This article is limited to discussing the HIPAA Privacy Rule's authorization re-
quirement, and waivers or modifications of that requirement, as discussed below. Thus, 
other important aspects of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, including consent requirements, 
non-research exceptions to the authorization requirement, notice of privacy practice 
provisions, internal safeguard provisions, certification provisions, and business associate 
provisions, are beyond the scope of this article and will not be discussed. For an 'in 
depth discussion of these topics, see generally Julie Bruce, Bioterrorism Meets Privacy: 
An Analysis of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act and the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 75 (2003); Diane Kutzko et aI., HIPAA in Real Time:-Prac-
tical Implications of the Federal Privacy Rule, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 403 (2003); Peter A. 
Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 
33 RUTGERS L. J. 617 (2002). 
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As far as the circumstances under which PHI may be used 
or disclosed under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the Rule seeks to 
limit significantly the number of permissible uses and disclo-
sures.38 In particular, there are six permitted uses and disclo-
sures of PHI under the HIPAA Privacy Rule." However, only 
two of these provisions are pertinent to remote sensing re-
searchers seeking the disclosure of PHI: the authorization pro-
visions and the provisions providing exceptions to the authori-
zation provisions.40 
Generally, under the authorization provisions, "a covered 
entity may not use or disclose protected health information 
without an authorization that is valid under [the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule]."41 For the authorization to be ''valid,'' it must con-
tain six "core elements"42 and three "required statements."" 
Once an authorization is received by a covered entity, all subse-
quent uses of PHI under the authorization must be consistent 
with the terms ofthe authorization.44 
USee 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a). 
"' [d. § 164.502(a)(1). 
~o [d. § 164.502(a)(1)(iv), (vi). The other four provisions which are not pertinent 
concern permitted disclosures of PHI: (1) to the individual; (2) for treatment, payment, 
or health care operations; (3) consistent with the ''minimum necessary" standard, where 
applicable; and (4) to other specified situations where the individual does not object to 
tlie use or disclosure. See id. § 164.502(a)(1)(i), (ii), (iii) and (v). The "minimum neces~ 
sary" standard does not apply to disclosures pursuant to a signed authorization. [d. § 
164.502(b)(2)(iii). 
41 Id. § 164.508(a)(I). An authorization can generally be revoked at the discretion of 
the individual who initially signed the authorization, unless the covered entity has 
taken action in reliance on the authorization. [d. § 164.508(b)(5)(i). 
4~ These core elements include: (1) a specific and meaningful description of the in-
formation to be used or disclosed; (2) the name of people authorized to make the re-
quested use or disclosure; (3) the name of people to whom the covered entity may make 
the requested use or disclosure; (4) a description of each purpose of the requested use or 
disclosure; (5) an expiration date or expiration event; and (6) signature of the individual 
or personal representative and the date. Id. § 164.508(c)(l)(i)-(vi). It is the last core 
element, the individual signature, which makes the authorization provisions so incom-
patible with the needs of most medical researchers dealing with massive data sets. 
43 The required statements are designed to place the individual on notice concerning 
his or her rights under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. They include: (1) a statement that the 
individual may revoke the waiver in writing; (2) a statement that treatment, payment, 
enrollment or eligibility is a condition or not a condition on such a waiver; and (3) a 
statement concerning the potential for PHI disclosure pursuant to the authorization to 
be redisclosed by the recipient and no longer be protected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
[d. § 164.508(c)(2)(i).(iii). 
" [d. § 164.508(a)(1). 
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Not all uses and disclosures of protected health informa-
tion, however, require an authorization from the affected indi-
viduaL In addition to certain permitted used and disclosures,45 
required disclosures,46 and uses and disclosures requiring an 
opportunity for the individual to agree or to object," the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule also establishes twelve categories of uses and dis-
closures for which an authorization or opportunity to agree or 
object is not required." In other words, in these twelve catego-
ries, a covered entity is permitted to use or disclose PHI without 
an authorization; the authorization requirement in these cases 
is altered or modified.49 The one exception to the authorization 
requirement which is of primary importance to this article is the 
so-called "research exception.,,50 The next section explores the 
research exception to the authorization requirement and the 
manner in which IREs and HPEs may be utilized to obtain a 
research waiver of the authorization requirement. 
III. THE RESEARCH EXCEPTION, IREs, AND HPEs 
A. The Research Exception 
"Research" is defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule as a "sys-
tematic investigation, including research development, testing, 
~ Id. § 164.502(a)(1). 
'" Id. § 164.502(a)(2). 
" Id. § 164.510. 
48 Id. § 164.512. For instance, exceptions exist for uses and disclosures required by 
law, concerning victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence, for judicial and adminis-
trative proceedings, and for law enforcement purposes. Id. § 164.512(a),(c), (e), and (f). 
'" Id. § 164.512. 
50 Id. § 164.512(i); see also infra Part lILA. Although SOIDe of the other categories 
may appear on their face to assist remote sensing researchers engaging in medical re-
search (see, e.g., "public health activities" (ld. § 164.502(b)), "health oversight activities" 
(Id. § 164.512(d)), and "serious threat to health or safety" (Id. § 164.512G»), these excep· 
tions generally would not apply to remote sensing researchers engaging in medical re-
search. For instance, the "public health activities" exception only applies to public 
health authorities authorized by law to collect or receive such information or other simi-
lar entities, see id. § 164.512(b)(1)(i)-(v), and the "health oversight activities" exception 
only applies to an health oversight agency engaged in oversight activities authorized by 
law. See id. § 164.512(d)(1)(i}-(iv). Most independent remote sensing researchers would 
not appear to come under these exceptions (with the notable exception of such individu-
als working for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or similar government health 
agency). 
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and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generaliz-
able knowledge.,,51 A covered entity may use or disclose PHI for 
research, regardless of the source of funding, in three different 
circumstances: (1) if an IRB or HPB approves a waiver of the 
authorization requirement; (2) if the scenario involves reviews 
merely preparatory to research; and (3) if the research concerns 
a decedent's health information. 52 
Proceeding in reverse order in examining these three types 
of research exceptions, a remote sensing researcher may only 
obtain PHI from a decedent for research purposes without ob-
taining an authorization if three additional conditions are met. 
First, the researcher must represent that the PHI is solely for 
research on the PHI of decedents.53 Second, the researcher must 
provide documentation that the decedents in question are, in 
fact, dead." Third, the researcher must explain why the dece-
dents' PHI is "necessary" for research purposes.55 
This third condition regarding the necessity of the decedent 
PHI for research purposes may prove to be the most difficult 
requirement to meet, depending on the predisposition of the cov-
ered entity to cooperate with the researcher. One can easily 
imagine where a health care provider, especially one who is 
gun-shy of HIPAA's well-publicized labyrinthine procedures, 
may say that no research is "necessary" under any circum-
51 ld. § 164.501. Such a broad definition would seem to clearly apply to all forms of 
remote sensing research. 
52 ld. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)-(iii). Another possible way to avoid the impact of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule as a researcher is to "de-identify" the health information to be disclosed, 
thus making the information no longer ''individually identifiable health information," 
and not subject to HIPAA generally. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d); § 164.514(a), (b) (im-
plementation specifications for de-identification). Although de-identification serves as a 
possible method by which remote sensing researchers may obtain relevant health infor-
mation, in most cases the researchers will need demographic information concerning the 
individual (including their addresses) which will make it unlikely that the de-identified 
health information would be of much use to the researcher. 
53 ld. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii)(A). This requirement is needlessly confusing. Does it mean 
that one can only use decedent PHI for research purposes if the researcher represents 
that his or her research only concerns decedents or instead that the researcher must 
represent that the decedent PHI will not be used for non-research purposes? Either 
interpretation is certainly plausible, but the latter one seems more reasonable. 
54 ld. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii)(B). Morbid humor aside, one assumes that a death certifi-
cate will suffice in this regard. 
M ld. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii)(C). 
262 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW [VOL. 30 
stance. In such instances, it is unclear in what manner an ag-
grieved researcher needing decedent PHI could challenge this 
determination. Nevertheless, to the extent a remote sensing 
researcher needs only decedent PHI to complete his or her re-
search, it would appear, in most cases, that the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule would not pose insurmountable difficulties. 56 
With regard to reviews preparatory to research, the second 
type of research exception, the usefulness of this provision to 
remote sensing researchers is substantially limited. Under 
these provisions, use or disclosure is restricted to preliminary 
utilization of PHI to develop a research protocol or "for similar 
purposes preparatory to research."" This condition appears to 
leave little room for the more thorough research manipulation 
for which most remote sensing researchers would require PHI. 
This prong of the research exception is also hindered by the 
same "necessary" query surrounding decedent PHI.58 As a re-
sult, this prong of the research exception provides little relief for 
the remote sensing researcher hoping to obtain PHI for medical 
research purposes. 
Because the decedent and the preparatory language provi-
sions are limited in their overall usefulness to remote sensing 
researchers seeking to obtain and use PHI for medical research, 
researchers most likely will have to attempt to comply with the 
remaining research exception, which requires either an IRB or 
HPB to sign off on a waiver of the HIPAA authorization re-
quirement. Under the waiver prong, the burden appears to be 
on the covered entity, rather than the researcher," in acquiring 
56 Of course, this prong of the exception does not assist a remote sensing research 
needing to combine geospatial data with PHI concerning the living. 
" Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii)(A). 
58 [d. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii)(C). A third condition is that no PHI may be removed by the 
researcher from the premises of the covered entity in the course of review. [d. § 
164.512(i)(1)(iii)(B). Needless to say, it would be hard to perform effective research 
under this additional burdensome condition. 
59 In this regard, the statutory language states: "A covered entity may use or dis-
close protected health information for research, regardless of the source of funding of the 
research, provided that: (i) Board approval of a waiver of autlwrization. The covered 
entity obtains documentation that an alteration or waiver ... of the individual authoriza-
tion [requirement] ... has been approved by either: (A) An Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) ... , or (B) A privacy board ... " Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(AJ-(B) (emphasis added). 
Compare this language to the decedent and preparatory language of the research excep-
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documentation that an alteration to, or waiver of, the authoriza-
tion requirement is necessary.60 
B. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) 
IRBs, unlike their HPB counterparts, are not new entities 
created by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Indeed, IRBs have been 
around for quite a while and were created to protect research 
participants from risks surrounding human subjects research." 
Not surprisingly, then, the HIPAA Privacy Rule not only re-
quires IRBs to meet new privacy criteria established by the 
Rule, but also requires the IRB to conduct its waiver review in 
line with criteria already established under the so-called "Com-
mon Rule," also called the "Federal Policy for Protection of Hu-
man Subjects.,,62 
Briefly,63 an institutional review board "is a board, commit-
tee, or other group formally designated by an institution to re-
tion in which the researcher must carry the burden of establishing that the requested 
PHI is "necessary" for the research purposes. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii)(C), (iii)(C). 
00 Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(A).(B). 
61 See IRB Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 1 (citing 45 C.F.R. Part 46 (Department of 
Health and Human Services Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects) and 21 
C.F.R. Parts 50 and 56 (Food and Drug Administration Regulations on Protection of 
Human Subjects)); see generally Office for Human Research Protections website, at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) or the FDA Human Research website, 
at http://www.fda.gov/odgcp (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). Other federal and state laws 
may provide additional privacy limitations, which may not be waived by either an IRB 
or HPB. IRB Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 1; see also supra note 9 (concerning HIPAA 
preemption). 
"' 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(A). Indeed, the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not change the 
composition or a number of procedural requirements that IRBs normally follow under 
the Common Rule when considering whether to approve proposed human subjects re-
search. IRB Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 3-4. 
6.1 A comprehensive recitation of all the regulations that typically apply to IRBs in 
human subjects research under the Common Rule is well beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. For further information on this topic, see generally Judith F. Daar, Symposium, 
Genetic Testing and Human Subjects Research, 24 WHITTIER L. REv. 429 (2002); Ber-
nard Lo, M.D. & Michelle Groman, Symposium, NBAC Recommendations on Oversight 
of Human Subjects Research, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 493 (2002); Michael J. Mali-
nowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Eugenics Past, Present, and Future?, 
36 CONN. L. REV. 125 (2003); Nancy M. Pliske, The Impact of the Privacy Rule on Re· 
search Activities, 676 PLIJPat 105 (2001) (published prior to August 2002 HHS modifica-
tion of research waiver provisions); Daniel J. Powell, Symposium, Using the False 
Claims Act as a Basis for Institutional Review Board Liability, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1399 
(2002). 
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view researching humans as subjects,"" and generally consists 
of at least five members with varying backgrounds to ensure 
complete and adequate review of the proposed research activi-
ties." These IREs are given broad authority to approve, disap-
prove, or modifY, all research activities concerning the use of 
human research subjects, which are conducted or supported by 
federal departments or agencies.66 Under the Common Rule, 
IREs apply specified criteria to the proposed research to deter-
mine if the research in question should be approved." Not only 
must an IRE initially approve human subjects research accord-
ing to a defined set of criteria, it must periodically review the 
progress of the research." 
Even before the HIPAA Privacy Rule was contemplated, 
one of the criteria that IREs applied to determine whether to 
approve human subjects research concerned the privacy of the 
human subject. The regulation in question provides that the 
research protocol must include, "adequate provisions to protect 
the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of 
data."69 Although it can be assumed that past IREs sought to 
comply with this privacy standard in good faith; nevertheless, 
there did not exist either the comprehensive individual authori-
zation requirements concerning PHI, nor provisions concerning 
64 IRB Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 2. The National Institute of Health's Fact Sheet 
underscores the importance of IREs in stating that, "Every institution engaged in hu-
man subjects research conducted or supported by a Federal department or agency that 
has adopted the Common Rule (Federal Policy for Protection of Human Subjects) is 
required to designate one or more IREs under an assurance of compliance." ld. Institu-
tions covered by these regulations include hospitals, academic medical centers, and 
government units engaged in federally supported or conducted human subjects research. 
Id. 
G, ld. at 3. Not only is appointment to the IRB based on considerations of expertise, 
diversity, and experience, but at least one member must not be affiliated with the iru;ti~ 
tution, one member must be from a scientific area, one member must be from a nonsci-
entific area, and no member may have a conflict of interest. Id. at 3-4. 
66 Id. at 2. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
"" See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) (HHS provision); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(7) (FDA provi· 
sion). The ambiguity inherent in legal standards relying upon "adequate provisions" 
language will be discussed in detail below. See infra Part IV.A. 
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the waiver of such requirements, prior to the effective date of 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule.'o 
Now, IREs have been given the additional task to deter-
mine whether a covered HIPAA entity may release PHI without 
an individual's authorization for research purposes.7l Although 
existing IREs are most likely only to act on waiver of authoriza-
tion requests in connection with research activities they already 
oversee,72 IRE members will need to quickly familiarize them-
selves with the relevant substantive provisions of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule. These provisions will require IREs to produce 
documentation that establishes five specific conditions, in addi-
tion to any other existing requirements that may apply under 
the federal Common Rule. 
First, the IRE waiver document must include a statement 
identifYing the IRE and the date on which the waiver of the au-
thorization requirement was approved." Second, the waiver 
document must include "adequate assurances" that the IRE has 
determined that the release of the PHI to the researcher meets 
three express criterion: (1) the use of the PHI causes no more 
than a "minimal risk" to the privacy of individuals, based on the 
presence of an "adequate plan" (a) to protect identifiers from 
improper use,74 (b) to destroy the identifiers at the earliest pos-
sible opportunity consistent with the conduct of the research," 
and (c) to protect the PHI from improper reuse or disclosure to 
any other person or entity;76 (2) the research could not be practi-
70 The NIH Fact Sheet explains that the HIP AA Privacy Rule supplements previous 
HHS and FDA privacy provisions to ensure greater security of private health infonna-
tion. IRB Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 2. 
71 All that being said, IRBs will not be responsible for ensuring compliance with 
other provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. For example, IRBs will not be responsible 
for reviewing and approving individual authorizations to release PHI, only whether a 
waiver of the authorization requirement is appropriate under the circumstances. Id. 
72 Id. 
" 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(i). 
" Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)(1). 
75 Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)(2). Destruction of the identifiers within the released PHI 
need not occur to the extent that there is a health or research justification for retaining 
the identifiers or that such retention is required by law. [d. 
7G Again, there are exceptions to this general proscription again improper reuse or 
disclosure, including situations were such uses or disclosures are required by law, for 
authorized oversight of the research, or for other research for which the use of the PHI 
would be permitted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)(3). 
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cally done without a waiver;" and (3) the research could not 
practically be conducted without access to the PHI.78 
Third, the IRB waiver documentation must include a brief 
description of the PHI for which access has been determined to 
be necessary.79 Fourth, the documentation must contain assur-
ances that the waiver has been approved under either normal80 
or expedited81 review procedures already established by the 
Common Rule.82 Fifth, and finally, the documentation support-
ing the waiver of the HIPAA individual authorization require-
ment must be signed by the chairman of the IRB, or a designee 
selected by the chairman of the IRB.83 If all these conditions are 
met, the disclosure of the PHI to the researcher will be approved 
by the IRB, and the covered entity will be free to release the 
necessary PHI to the researcher without the researcher being 
required to obtain a HIPAA-compliant authorization from af-
fected individuals. 
C. HIPAA Privacy Boards (HPBs) 
So why does the HIPAA Privacy Rule also provide for HPBs 
in addition to already existing IRBs when a waiver of the 
HIPAA authorization requirement is at stake? Most simply, 
HPBs "do not exercise any other powers or authorities granted 
to IRBs under Federal laws relating to federally conducted or 
supported human subjects research and research involving 
products regulated by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).,,84 Consequently, it is easier to establish an HPB if a re-
searcher is not otherwise covered by federal human subjects 
research law. Thus, in situations in which a remote sensing 
n Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(B). 
'" Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(C). 
79 ld. § 164.512(i)(2)(iii). HHS has observed the researcher requesting the waiver of 
authorization may be in the best position to write the brief description of the PHI re-
quired by this section. HHS contemplates that the researcher could submit this infor-
mation as part of the request for waiver approval. Privacy Board Fact Sheet, supra note 
13, at 5. 
"" See generally 21 C.F.R. § 56.108; 45 C.F.R. § 108. 
e, See generally 21 C.F.R. § 56.110; 45 C.F.R. § 110. 
"' 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv). 
", Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(v). 
84 Privacy Board Fact Sheet, supra note 13, at 2. 
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researcher is just obtaining health information records concern-
ing past or current medical conditions, the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
allows an HPB to grant the necessary waiver of authorization 
without the researcher having to worry about complying with 
additional federal laws and regulations that apply to human 
subjects research. 
In addition to not being subject to burdensome federal laws 
revolving around federal human subjects research, there are a 
number of other potential advantages to forming an HPB versus 
forming, or relying upon, an existing IRB." For one thing, an 
HPB need only consist of at least two members, as opposed to 
the five member panels of an IRE." Furthermore, the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, in addition to a normal review procedure," sets 
out a less burdensome expedited review procedure for cases in 
which there is only a "minimal risk" to the privacy of individu-
als involved.88 In expedited instances, the Chair alone, or his or 
her designee, may grant the necessary waiver without conven-
ing the full HPB.89 
Nevertheless, these additional advantages provided by the 
HPB provisions are still circumscribed by many of the same 
rules that apply to IRBs. For instance, as far as HPB member-
ship is concerned, the HPB must produce the same documenta-
tion that establishes the five specific conditions discussed above 
in relation to an IRE. 90 These conditions also include the same 
three adequate assurances under which the HPB must deter-
8.'i An existing IRE set up at a given institution for one purpose does not preclude 
that same institution from establishing an HPB for another research purpose. IRBs and 
HPBs can coexist at the same institution. See id. at 3. 
" [d. at 2; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(B). 
87 The normal HPB review procedure requires that a majority of the HPB members 
be present, including one of whom satisfies the nonaffiliated criteria, and the waiver 
must be approved by the majority of the privacy board members present at the meeting, 
unless the HPB elects to utilize an expedited review. See 45 C.F.R. § 
164. 512(i)(2 )(iv)(B). 
B8 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(C). The expedited procedures available for IRBs 
appear to be much more onerous for researchers to use than those expedited procedures 
established for HPBs under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. See id. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(A). For 
instance, to qualify for an expedited review by an IRB, one must fall within a list of 
categories of research established by the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.110(a),(b). 
S9 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(C). Nevertheless, that member must meet the unaf-
filiated criteria set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(B). 
00 See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text. 
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mine that the release of the PHI in question is permissible." 
Additionally, members of an HPB must have varying back-
grounds and the requisite experience and knowledge," including 
one of whom is not affiliated in any manner with the institution 
involved." Similarly, no one may serve on the HPB if that per-
son has a conflict of interest.94 
All in all, however, the HPB appears to provide an easier 
procedural device for a remote sensing researcher to obtain the 
necessary waiver of authorization when individual authoriza-
tions for the release of PHI are impractical to acquire. Nonethe-
less, and as with the IRB provisions, there are many HPB pro-
visions which may be subject to abuse and detrimentally impact 
the ability of a remote sensing researcher to obtain PHI to com-
plete his or her geospatial research. The next Section explores 
some of these potential pitfalls and recommends a "special 
needs" approach consistent with Fourth Amendment privacy 
law. 
N. SWATTING THE MOSQUITO: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL-BASED OINTMENT 
A. The Mosquito: The Enigmatic Nature of the Research 
Waiver Approval Process Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
Not surprisingly, when the research waiver provisions were 
modified in August 2002 in response to growing criticism, they 
were still censured for being "confusing, redundant, and inter-
nally inconsistent."" Although HHS has since issued a number 
of guidance documents," little comfort has been provided for 
IRB or HPB members who must implement the provisions. For 
instance, how does one know whether they are eligible for the 
91 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
", 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(B)(1). 
"' Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(B)(2). 
"' Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(B)(3). 
~5 See Scaraglino, supra note 20, at 566 (quoting Standards for Privacy of Individu-
ally Identifiable Health Information, 67 FED. REG. 53, 229). 
96 See generally Understanding HIPAA, supra note 9; Privacy Board Fact Sheet, 
supra note 13; IRB Fact Sheet, supra note 24. 
2004] HIPAA AND REMOTE SENSING RESEARCH 269 
quick, less expensive, expedited review procedure? This expe-
dited review would appear to permit one, unaffiliated privacy 
board member to sign off on a disclosure of PHI for research 
purposes.97 All that is known is that expedited review is permit-
ted in cases in which "the research involves no more than mini-
mal risk to the privacy of the individuals who are the subject of 
the protected health information."98 Of course, the question is 
begged: What in the world is a "minimal risk"? 
Although there is no definition provided in the expedited 
review section of the HIPAA regnlations or in the gnidance 
documents for this important terminology," the same "minimal 
risk" langnage is used in discussing the waiver criteria for ap-
proving a waiver of authorization by either an IRB or HPB un-
der normal review procedures. In this context, we are told that: 
The use or disclosure of protected health information [must] 
involveD no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of indi-
viduals, based on, at least, the presence of the following ele-
ments; (1) An adequate plan to protect the identifiers ... ; (2) 
An adequate plan to destroy the identifiers at the earliest op-
portunity ... ; and (3) Adequate written assurances that the 
protected health information will not be reused or disclosed to 
any other person or entity ... 100 
At first sight, this langnage would suggest that these three 
waiver criteria create the floor for a HPB finding that the dis-
closure of certain research does not present more than a mini-
mal risk to the privacy of the individual. But there are at least 
two problems with this reasoning. First, it makes the normal 
and expedited review procedures practically indistingnishable 
with regard to the minimal risk standard.1Ol This result makes 
little sense since the normal review provisions specifically dif-
ferentiates its procedures from the expedited review proce-
97 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
e" 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(C) (emphasis added). 
" See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. 
'" Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). 
101 Of course, the normal review procedure would also require a statement that the 
research could not practically be conducted without the waiver and without access to 
and use of the protected health information. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(B). (C). 
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dures. '02 Second, even if we were to make the three waiver cri-
terion the sine qua non of meeting the minimal risk standard for 
expedited waiver purposes, these three criteria still require us 
to define the meaning of such imponderables as "adequate plan" 
or "adequate written assurances." 
Again, a question is begged: "adequate" to whom? The no-
tion that this determination may be based on little more than 
what an IRB or HPB member ate for breakfast103 is more than a 
little disconcerting for those of us particular about such things 
as consistency and uniformity in the law. In short, we are left 
with highly-indeterminate legal standards, with no statutory 
definitions or precedent available for guidance, and whether 
PHI is permitted to be disclosed, and in how quickly a fashion 
this disclosure may proceed, may depend on nothing more than 
on how decisionmakers individually define "minimal risk," "ade-
quate plan," or "adequate written assurances." Hardly the stuff 
to make remote sensing researchers rush to their nearest 
HIPAA covered entity, ask for the creation of an HPB, and than 
cross their fingers that their research meets the minimal 
risk/adequate plan/adequate assurances criteria of the HPB ex-
pedited review procedures. 
B. Proposed Constitutional-Based Ointment: 
A Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Approach 
In deciding what would be a more appropriate approach to 
disclosure of PHI for research purposes than the current one, it 
is worthwhile to consider at least the following questions: How 
much value should we place on keeping our health records and 
information private? Is health information privacy so sacrosanct 
that we are willing to proscribe medical research that might 
assist in the eradication of diseases from which we and our 
loved ones now, or one day will, suffer? Are there not times 
when there is a substantial need for medical research to help 
,,, Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(B). 
103 See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 1457, 1464-65 (2003) (observing the common legal realist critique of judicial 
decision making). 
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fight a disease, but the inevitable price is the loss of some indi-
vidual medical privacy? 
My approach to these thorny questions is based on giving 
sufficient consideration to each of the competing interests and 
then attempting to balance these interests based on the specific 
circumstances of each PHI disclosure case. This balancing ap-
proach in the individual health privacy context is certainly not 
novel; it draws upon the Supreme Court's treatment of "reason-
ableness/special needs" cases104 under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.105 Even though the Fourth 
Amendment applies only to the federal government (and to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment),106 and thus may not 
apply to a large number of remote sensing researchers seeking 
PHI for research purposes,'07 such a well-developed and well-
established area of law nevertheless helps to fill in some of the 
more glaring gaps in the current version of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule's research waiver provisions. 
In "special needs" cases, the warrant and probable cause 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are relaxed to permit 
the satisfaction of special government needs in carrying out gov-
ernmentally-sanctioned searches of individuals and their ef-
fects. 'os In these cases, rather than require the government to 
1(1.1 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (supervision of probationers 
constitutes "special need" requiring more relaxed rule for searches); O'Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (the need of an employer to enter an employee's office, desk, or 
files comprises "special need" and no warrant is required); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (finding warrant requirement unsuited to school context because 
it unduly interferes with the maintenance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures). 
105 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized."). 
100 See Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795, 799 (2003) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961)). 
107 The Fourth Amendment would presumably apply to remote sensing researchers 
employed by federal agencies, such as NASA, or state agencies, such as the Mississippi 
Bureau of Narcotics. It would not, however, apply to the purely private acts of remote 
sensing researchers. For an insightful discussion of the state action doctrine under the 
United States Constitution, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Narrowing the State 
Action Doctrine, 35 TRIAL 101 (1999). 
100 See Seth M. Haines, Comment, Rounding Up The Usual Suspects: The Rights of 
Arab Detainees in a Post-September 11 World, 57 ARK. L. REV. 105, 121 (2004) ("In spe-
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obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before permitting 
such a search, the Supreme Court has permitted "reasonable-
ness" to be the touchstone upon which the analysis revolves.1O' 
In turn, ''whether a particular search meets the reasonableness 
standard 'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.' "no 
These "special needs" cases are, in fact, similar in orienta-
tion to the inquiry for research waivers under the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule. In each situation, a sensitive balancing of individual 
privacy interests in certain information must be weighed 
against some external (governmental or otherwise) need for that 
same information. III More specifically, in the HIPAA context, 
the question introduced may be "the single most important [one] 
cial needs cases, intrusions upon Fourth Amendment were allowed because they 
'serve[d] special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement ... "'} 
(quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989» 
(alteration in original). The Von Raab Court stated, "our cases establish that where a 
Fourth Am.'endment intrusion serves special governmental needs ... it is necessary to 
balance th,e individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to 
determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized 
suspicion ... " Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. 
to9 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) ("As the text of the 
Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a gov-
ernmental search is 'reasonableness.'''). 
no ld. at 652-653 (quoting in part Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executive Assn., 489 U.s. 
602,617 (1989»; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (reasonableness depends on "balancing 
the need of the search against the invasion the search entails.") (quoting Camara v. 
Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967». Specifically, the Court makes its reasonableness 
determination by weighing the nature and character of the individual's privacy interest 
against both the character of the intrusion by the government and the nature and im-
mediacy of the government's concern. See generally Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-664; Bd. 
of Educ. of Independent Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-838 (2002). In 
Vernonia, for instance, this balance was struck in favor of allowing the school district to 
implement a student athlete drug policy in a high school environment. See Vernonia, 
515 U.S. at 663. In Earls, the Court extended Vernonia to permit drug testing to all 
students engaged in competitive extracurricular activities. See Earls, 536 U.s. at 830. 
111 Let me stress that this analogy to the Fourth Amendment only goes so far. 
Clearly, the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not normally concern criminal behavior, nor the 
potential of incarceration. Nevertheless, the schemata established by the "special 
needs" line of Fourth Amendment cases brings much needed clarity and simplification to 
the legal analysis surrounding research waivers under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
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raised in the 21st century by Americans, namely balancing ... 
. hnl'ld ,,112 prIvacy concerns versus tee 0 oglCa a vancements. 
Under the special needs HIPAA balance, the nature of the 
individual's privacy interest in his or her medical records will 
always be strong, as individuals have significant and legitimate 
expectations of privacy in their PHI.1l3 Nevertheless, as strong 
as that privacy interest is, in analogous contexts courts have 
recognized that others may have sufficient reason to justify in-
trusion into the private health records of an individual."4 In the 
HIPAA research waiver context, if the character of the intrusion 
is minimally invasive (in that disclosure of the PHI is limited to 
a small number of researchers), and the nature and the imme-
diacy of the concern is compelling (in that an epidemic of some 
sort is at hand), this might lead an IRB or HPB to pennit the 
disclosure of PHI for research purposes. 
More concretely, and starting where we began, the West 
Nile Virus example helps to illustrate how the "special needs" 
approach would apply in deciding whether to release medical 
infonnation to a remote sensing researcher hoping to combine 
medical data with his or her geospatial research. To begin with, 
the individual privacy interest in their health records would be 
high. "5 Thus, an individual who has, or had, West Nile Virus, 
may be unwilling to sign an authorization to release their medi-
cal records for research purposes. Nevertheless, under a special 
m See PPA Litigation, 2003 WL 22203734, at *8. ''The more accessible that personal 
information becomes, the more critical it is to create intelligible guidelines to provide an 
equitable balance between the individual's interest in his or her privacy and the na-
tional interest, in this instance, [sic] HIPAA compliance." [d. 
1]3 AB an example of the importance of the privacy of medical records, prior appellate 
decisions have held that the United States Constitution provides a qualified protection 
for medical records sought by search warrant or subpoena. See In re Search Warrant 
(Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). Of course, the HIPAA Privacy Rule itself is a strong 
indication of the strong federal policy in favor of protecting the privacy of individual 
health records. See United States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 (W.D. Va. 
2001) (noting that the recent Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act dem-
onstrated "strong federal policy" of protecting medical records). 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84, 88-89 (D. Mass. 2003) 
("[I]ndividual's privacy interest in medical records must be balanced against the legiti-
mate need of others in obtaining disclosure.") (quoting United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 
1280. 1285 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
115 See supra note 113. 
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needs balancing test, the argnment can be made that the char-
acter of the disclosure of the West Nile Virus PHI to the remote 
sensing researcher is minimally invasive, as the researcher may 
be able to limit his or her informational needs to the physical 
address of the individual, and may not need other demographic, 
sensitive information. 
Moreover, the nature and immediacy of the researchers and 
the public's concern are substantial in light of the barrage of 
press coverage West Nile Virus has received in the last five 
years and the impact this disease had had, both physically and 
psychologically, on society in genera!."' Performing the special 
needs balancing in this manner, it appears that it would be rea-
sonable for a HPB or IRB to grant a waiver to the normal au-
thorization requirement and allow limited, specified disclosures 
of individual health information concerning an individual's con-
traction of the West Nile Virus. Although by no means empiri-
cally proven, my sense is that most people would be willing to 
agree to such a minimal intrusion into their health records if 
they believed that they, or their loved ones, could benefit from 
the eradication ofa disease such as West Nile Virus. 
The advantage of the "special needs" approach over the cur-
rent "necessary and adequate" approach is obvious: there is a 
well-established and significant line of case law to which to 
analogize the situations that covered entities and remote sens-
ing researchers are likely to find themselves in relation to the 
disclosure of PHI. On the other hand, as currently written, the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions that shape IRB or HPB deter-
minations are too ambignous to properly place the competing 
interests to be balanced directly in front of the decisionmakers. 
There are simply no helpful definitions provided for these stan-
dards. The danger is that current waiver determinations will 
not be based on properly structured discretion, but rather on 
116 A search of "West Nile Virus" on Westlaw's ALLNEWS database returned over 
10,000 results on May 26, 2004. Some recent, representative press clippings include, 
Dan D'Ambrosio, West Nile: Disease No One Can Figure Out How To Fight, CAPITAL 
TIMES & WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, May 24, 2004, at A1; Edie Lan, West Nile's Viru-
lence in U.S. probed as new season nears, CINCINNATI POST, May 20, 2004, at A22; 
Christopher Windham, West Nile Vaccine Prompts Antibodies in Tests, WALL ST. 
JOURNAL, May 25, 2004. at D3. 
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Board members' "gut" feelings; dissimilar results for similar 
factual scenarios being the unfortunate consequence. 
Additionally, the current approach may lead remote sensing 
researchers to shy away from undertaking this important medi-
cal research if the procedural hurdles prove too difficult or un-
rewarding. For instance, having to proceed through the IRB or 
HPB process might both dramatically increase the time and ex-
pense associated with the collection of PHI. The unintentional 
consequence may be that remote sensing techniques that are 
essential to the eradication of a disease such as West Nile Virus 
might not be sufficiently utilized. In the end, of course, we will 
all be worse off if diseases like West Nile linger and continue to 
claim victims. 
To avoid this unappealing scenario, this article proposes 
that the waiver approval process of the research exception to 
the HIPAA authorization requirement be modified to require 
both HPBs and IRBs to undertake a Fourth Amendment-type 
special needs analysis, with the concept of reasonableness at its 
foundation, in order to determine whether to disclose specific 
PHI to remote sensing researchers. Such a revamped, simpli-
fied procedure will have the advantage of being more time and 
cost-effective as time-tested legal analyses are applied in place 
of burdensome, technical provisions. This approach will also 
have the advantage of spurring additional remote sensing re-
search in health-related areas. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The challenge for those that administer the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule in the future will be to recognize that protecting patient 
health information is not an all or nothing proposition, but in-
stead requires a nuanced and subtle approach which accommo-
dates the competing interests at stake. By providing for the 
research exception and the related IRB and HPB waiver provi-
sions in the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS seems to have already 
grasped this essential notion. Indeed, this article does not con-
test the basic approach that HHS has adopted in leaving waiver 
determinations to the individual IRBs and HPBs to decide un-
der what conditions sensitive health information can be re-
276 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW [VOL. 30 
leased for research purposes. Nevertheless, adoption of the pro-
posed "special needs" analysis in place of the current "necessary 
and adequate" approach will substantially eliminate uncer-
tainty for remote sensing researchers who will be increasingly 
utilizing medical records and information in conjunction with 
their remote sensing and geospatia! research. 
In the end, if IRBs and HPBs are successfully able to man-
age the balancing process through use of these clearer and sim-
plified waiver standards, then society will surely reap the bene-
fits of important new medical discoveries. This is because as 
more and more remote sensing researchers are able to access 
necessary medical research in a more timely and less expensive 
manner, diseases like West Nile Virus will more quickly become 
a distant memory of a less technologically-sophisticated past. 
